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ABSTRACT: In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of 
Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and 
innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to 
knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist 
aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, 
by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists 
with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of 
fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. 
Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of 
Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that 
it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, 
notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion 
is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later 
Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not. 
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To analyze an ordinary proposition, such as “There is a lamp on my table,” or “I am 
working at a table,” and to treat such analysis as a starting point from which it is 
possible to get anywhere. This is the methodological opening chosen by Nuno 
Venturinha for his Description of Situations, a short and yet incisive and highly 
original work in contextualist epistemology.1 The idea, inspired by Wittgenstein, is 
that the description of a situation should offer all that is needed for a 
comprehensive philosophical analysis ranging from language to ontology, from 
truth to modality and possible worlds, from the nature of thought to 
transcendentalism, from skepticism to social dependency. This is an ambitious 
project carried out in an unconventional way: at first glance, “I am writing at a 
table” (maybe by the fire?) seems all too familiar as the beginning of a 
                                                        
1 Nuno Venturinha, Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Cham: 
Springer, 2018). 
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philosophical reflection; however, Venturinha starts from the proposition rather 
than the situation itself, examining its different constituents, the way in which the 
words are interrelated, and the way in which they explicitly and implicitly refer to 
or imply a whole cluster of contexts, theories, and philosophical perspectives. 
Venturinha’s work however is not only original because of its 
methodological and stylistic choices: it is so also in virtue of its contents. While he 
does not explicitly identify with any of the existent variants in epistemic 
contextualism, he undertakes a wide-ranging historical-philosophical journey, 
putting different perspectives into dialogue and finding allies (or at least partial 
allies) in thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Aquinas, Bolzano, Frege, and (mostly) the 
later Wittgenstein of On Certainty, as well as David Lewis and Fernando Gil. 
Venturinha’s theoretical aim is to propose a form of contextualism compatible with 
and indeed grounding a realist position. He claims that “a contextualist approach is 
required if we pursue solid epistemic standards”2 and wants to find a way to 
conciliate contextualism with “the objectivism that a contextualist perspective 
seems to challenge.”3 As he puts it elsewhere, the attempt is to keep together “a 
realist epistemological view with the relativity that results from the context-
sensitivity inherent in our knowledge attributions.”4 The picture he draws is that 
of a world composed of states of affairs upon which individual and perspectival 
representations supervene.5 And if this is somewhat reminiscent of the Tractatus, 
Venturinha’s use of the later Wittgenstein of On Certainty wants to highlight 
something very similar. Unlike contemporary contextualists who are primarily 
interested in the variability of our knowledge attributions, in Venturinha’s reading, 
Wittgenstein shows that we are always led to assume something as evident, 
whatever context we might happen to inhabit or consider. It is this background of 
presuppositions that allows the ordinary evidence to be taken as evidence, and this 
is what guarantees, in the end, objectivity and realism. 
Whether a realist interpretation of Wittgenstein is feasible and fruitful or 
not is itself a huge topic for discussion, as is the tenability of a strongly realist 
version of epistemic contextualism, and I prefer not to deal with either in the short 
space of this commentary. Rather, I am interested in focusing on a related but more 
circumscribed issue; namely, that of fallibilism vs. infallibilism. Connected to 
Venturinha’s realist attitude are his commitment to the factivity of knowledge, his 
                                                        
2 Ibid., 32. 
3 Ibid., 85, my emphasis.  
4 Nuno Venturinha, “Précis of Description of Situations,” Philosophia 48 (2020): 1683–1690, here 
1683.   
5 Ibid. 
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conviction that a contextualist approach is (and must be) able to preserve that 
factivity, and his endorsement of a form of infallibilism (see chapter 6 in 
particular). Following David Lewis, Venturinha excludes from the domain of 
legitimate knowledge claims all those possibilities that we are “properly ignoring,” 
those possibilities that contrast with our proper presuppositions; in this way, 
certain hypotheses (typically, skeptical hypotheses) remain outside the scope of 
what we are considering. But within that scope—and here is where infallibilism 
enters the scene—our knowledge, if it is knowledge, is infallible. 
Venturinha expands on this in his more recent “Non-sceptical 
Infallibilism,”6 where he quotes, with approval, Lewis’ infallibilist take: “To speak 
of fallible knowledge, of knowledge despite uneliminated possibilities of error, just 
sounds contradictory.”7 Yet, there is an intuitive sense in which fallibilism simply 
reflects a common conception of knowledge, according to which, roughly, S knows 
p on the basis of r provided that r makes p sufficiently probable, with only a 
minimal and negligible residue of uncertainty; this was what Cohen had in mind 
when he claimed, a few decades ago, that fallibilism—though in need of 
refinement—was generally accepted in epistemology.8 After all, claiming that we 
know something and at the same time acknowledging that it still might turn out 
that we are wrong is not only possible, but pretty common. This is especially clear 
whenever we take a retrospective look at our knowledge claims, recognizing that 
we thought we knew something, and we were justified in our claim then, but we 
actually were wrong. The contrast between the two views has recently led DeRose9 
to distinguish between an intuitive and a more demanding “GC (Genuine 
Conflict)” version of fallibilism, whereby Cohen is using the former, and Lewis the 
latter: in this view, the opposition between seeing fallibilism as reasonable 
knowledge (Cohen) and seeing it as a kind of madness (Lewis) is merely verbal, as 
it depends on there being two different concepts of fallibilism at play in the two 
theories. 
Now, Venturinha does not want to deny that human beings are fallible 
creatures and have false beliefs. This is patently true for him.10 What he claims, 
rather, is that “someone who knows that p cannot be mistaken about p—even if 
                                                        
6 Nuno Venturinha, “Non-sceptical Infallibilism,” Analysis 80 (2020): 186–195. 
7 David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549–567, here 
549. 
8 Stewart Cohen, “How to be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 91–123. 
9 Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Fallibilism,” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic 
Contextualism, ed. J. J. Ichikawa (London: Routledge, 2017), 145–155. 
10 See Venturinha, “Non-sceptical Infallibilism,” 188.  
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one can admit a possibility in which one would be under the illusion of knowing 
that p;” and this is because “any far-fetched possibilities in which not-p are 
contextually excluded.”11 This is a form of infallibilism, he affirms, because there 
cannot be a lack of knowledge with respect to what it is fundamental to assume in 
the actual context under consideration.  
While I think that the existence of different notions of fallibilism does 
matter—and that Venturinha’s position might also be called fallibilist according to 
a relaxed notion of fallibilism (whereby excluding certain hypotheses means 
admitting that we cannot really know that such hypotheses cannot occur)—it is 
important to understand what exactly Venturinha is ruling out here, because, 
regardless of such labels, therein lies the substance of his claim. If I am reading him 
correctly, besides excluding skeptical scenarios, he is also ruling out the possibility 
of a non-general, non-radical, non-skeptical kind of fallibility. His position then 
amounts to affirming that if one knows, one is infallible in their knowledge, 
contextually speaking.  
It can be argued that an infallibilist position is compatible with and 
supported by Wittgenstein’s views in On Certainty. Indeed, the indubitability of 
hinges is often stressed by Wittgenstein (as well as commentators), along with the 
impossibility of making genuine mistakes about hinges, and the claim that to make 
a mistake about our basic assumptions, presuppositions or beliefs would look like a 
mental disturbance rather than a mere error. He defines objective certainty itself 
(the kind of hinge certainty he is investigating) as characterized by the logical 
impossibility of mistakes.12 So, for instance: 
Would this be correct: If I merely believed wrongly that there is a table here in 
front of me, this might still be a mistake; but if I believe wrongly that I have seen 
this table, or one like it, every day for several months past, and have regularly 
used it, that isn't a mistake?13 
In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake. (“Can” is here used 
logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false 
in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those 
propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: 
we should regard him as demented.14 
                                                        
11 Ibid. 
12 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, 
translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), § 194. 
13 Ibid., § 75. 
14 Ibid., § 155. 
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I have suggested that the way in which Wittgenstein deals with doubt and 
certainty shows similarities with a pragmatist perspective.15 Yet, the pragmatist 
perspective is traditionally and uncontroversially taken as the exemplary case 
(maybe the very origin) of a fallibilist approach to knowledge.16 But if Venturinha 
is right in finding support for his infallibilist account of a contextualist 
epistemology in a Wittgensteinian approach to certainty and evidence, then there 
must be some incoherence or incompatibility between the Wittgensteinian and the 
pragmatist views of knowledge. 
I think there are differences between the two, but these differences are not 
so much related to their respective attitudes towards the fallibility or infallibility of 
human knowledge (including contextual human knowledge). I will show this in 
three steps: first, by describing a general similarity between Wittgenstein and the 
pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the 
kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. 
Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s 
concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to 
find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his 
insistence on the impossibility of mistakes on hinges. 
The existence of general similarities between Wittgensteinian and 
pragmatist views on the importance of contexts is generally acknowledged. 
Following Medina17 it is possible to identify some features that are common in both 
Wittgenstein and the pragmatists: the materiality of language (the embeddedness 
of linguistic practices in forms of life); the performativity of language (the 
inseparability of words and actions); the social character of the contexts in which 
words and sentences acquire meaning; and the temporal dimension of such 
discursive contexts. Medina also highlights the tacit background agreement that, in 
both views, allows a sharing of perspectives that in the end is meaning itself, a 
background that in his opinion is not to be intended as a foundation. What both 
views suggest, Medina observes, is that once contexts are properly taken into 
                                                        
15 Anna Boncompagni, Wittgenstein and Pragmatism: On Certainty in the Light of Peirce and 
James (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
16 Hilary Putnam has famously claimed in Pragmatism: An Open Question (Oxford and 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), 21: “That one can be both fallibilistic and antisceptical is 
perhaps the basic insight of American Pragmatism.” 
17 José Medina, “In Defense of Pragmatic Contextualism: Wittgenstein and Dewey on Meaning 
and Agreement,” The Philosophical Forum 35(3) (2004): 341–369. Medina discusses Dewey in 
particular, but his reasoning can safely be extended to pragmatism in general. 
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account, the underdetermination of meanings does not result in indeterminacy; on 
the contrary, it results in meanings becoming contextually determinate.18 
Granted this, let me turn to the pragmatists’ attitude concerning doubt and 
certainty. I’d like to call attention here to Charles S. Peirce’s writings on critical 
common-sensism, which represent his way of absorbing and at the same time 
overcoming Thomas Reid’s common-sense philosophy. Besides echoing Reid’s 
rejection of the “closet doubt” of philosophers in his own rejection of the “paper 
doubt” of a Cartesian skeptic (in much the same style as Wittgenstein does), Peirce 
is here interested in identifying a class of indubitable assumptions that are 
generally common to humankind and are in principle exempt from doubt (to use a 
Wittgensteinian expression). 
There are, according to Peirce, three kinds of “indubitables.”19 Indubitables 
of the first kind are perceptual judgments: we cannot doubt what we perceive. 
Those of the second kind are acritical inferences, where “acritical” means 
“unexamined:” our reasoning proceeds according to some instinctive general 
principles, habits of thought, guiding rules, of which we are normally unaware. 
Basically, these are the rules of logic or reasoning. Finally, the third type of 
indubitables are “original beliefs of a general and recurrent kind,” where “original” 
means “uncriticised.” These original beliefs are instinctive and common to all 
human beings; they can change through time, but very slowly and almost 
imperceptibly. Examples are the belief that fire burns, and the belief in the 
criminality of incest. Now, what perceptual judgments, acritical inferences, and 
original beliefs have in common, is that we normally take them for granted in our 
ordinary life, in an instinctive, natural, implicit way, without doubting them, and 
without the need to somewhat justify or ground them. But the reason why they are 
indubitable is not that they are self-evident truths: rather, the point is that in our 
present situation, we do not see that they are subject to doubt.20 Indubitability, 
therefore, does not entail truth: human knowledge is fallible, and it is fallible even 
                                                        
18 See in particular John Dewey’s paper “Context and Thought,” in The Later Works of John 
Dewey, 1925–1953, Volume 6 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1985), 3–22, with its insistence on the fact that “neglect of context is the greatest single disaster 
which philosophic thinking can incur” (11), and more generally his Experience and Nature, in 
The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953, Volume 1 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1985). 
19 Charles S. Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. I‒VI, ed. by P. Weiss 
and C. Hartshorne (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 5.442 (volume number, 
paragraph number). 
20 J.E. Broyles, “Charles S. Peirce and the Concept of Indubitable Belief,” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society 1, 2 (1965): 77–89. 
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on indubitables. Without contradiction, from this perspective, it is possible to 
consider something indubitable, and yet acknowledge that we might be wrong. 
This is so even for perceptual judgments: perception too indeed for Peirce is 
indubitable but always fallible. Additionally, in explaining what the difference is 
between his view and Thomas Reid’s, Peirce emphasizes that critical common-
sensists are critical in that they assign a great value to doubt (the genuine doubt of 
a real inquiry, of course, not the paper doubt that Peirce criticized). This means 
that they are aware that nothing prevents an indubitable to be doubted, and even 
to be declared false, in the future. Indubitables indeed only remain such “in their 
application to affairs that resemble those of a primitive mode of life.”21 To reiterate, 
in this view there is no contradiction between indubitability and fallibility: 
[W]hile it is possible that propositions that really are indubitable, for the time 
being, should nevertheless be false, yet in so far as we do not doubt a proposition 
we cannot but regard it as perfectly true and perfectly certain.22 
Given the similarity between Peirce’s indubitables and Wittgenstein’s 
hinges, one can ask whether this conclusion holds for Wittgenstein as well. My 
answer is both yes and no. Let me first explain why I think not. 
The views are not the same because in Peirce, but not in Wittgenstein, there 
is only a difference of degree between indubitability and dubitability, and what is 
indubitable belongs to the same “realm,” so to speak, of what is dubitable: the 
epistemic realm. Indubitables and ordinary beliefs, in the end, are made of the 
same stuff. Conversely, in Wittgenstein there is a difference in kind or a 
categorical distinction between hinges and ordinary beliefs, and the indubitability 
of hinges is logical, not empirical: it is because of the framework role that a hinge 
plays in a language game, that it cannot be put in doubt. This is a big difference 
indeed, and it is traceable back to a more general difference between Wittgenstein 
and pragmatism, having to do with the nature of knowledge and inquiry and the 
relationship between science and philosophy. But I do not want to linger on this. 
The “yes” side of the answer is what matters: I believe that, notwithstanding his 
insistence on the impossibility of making mistakes concerning hinges, a form of 
fallibilism is present in Wittgenstein too. This might sound contentious, and I am 
certainly not claiming that Wittgenstein was a fallibilist in the same sense of Peirce 
(as I hope to have shown above); nevertheless, I think it is worth examining a 
couple of remarks from OC in order to investigate this further: 
I say “I know p” either to assure people that I, too, know the truth p, or simply as 
                                                        
21 Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 5.445. 
22 Ibid., 5.498. 
Anna Boncompagni 
514 
an emphasis of |-p. One says too, “I don't believe it, I know it.” And one might 
also put it like this (for example): “That is a tree. And that's not just surmise.” 
But what about this: “If I were to tell someone that that was a tree, that wouldn't 
be just surmise.” Isn't this what Moore was trying to say?23 
It would not be surmise and I might tell it to someone else with complete 
certainty, as something there is no doubt about. But does that mean that it is 
unconditionally the truth? May not the thing that I recognize with complete 
certainty as the tree that I have seen here my whole life long—may this not be 
disclosed as something different? May it not confound me? 
And nevertheless it was right, in the circumstances that give this sentence 
meaning, to say “I know (I do not merely surmise) that that's a tree.” To say that 
in strict truth I only believe it, would be wrong. It would be completely 
misleading to say: “I believe my name is L.W.” And this too is right: I cannot be 
making a mistake about it. But that does not mean that I am infallible about it.24 
Wittgenstein is here interested in the difference between saying “I know” 
and saying “I believe.” In this context, he notices that telling someone with 
complete certainty “I know (and do not merely surmise) that that’s a tree” is right, 
precisely like in the case of one’s name: “I know” and do not merely “surmise” or 
“believe” that my name is so-and-so. Additionally, I cannot make a mistake on this. 
It is indubitable. Nevertheless, “that does not mean that I am infallible about it.” 
The last sentence is surprising if one interprets indubitableness and the 
impossibility of mistakes in an infallibilist framework. But I think it should not be 
interpreted too straightforwardly as a fallibilist claim either, if fallibilism is 
intended as something that keeps the door open to skepticism. Wittgenstein is not 
claiming that we will never really know what our name is, or we will never really 
know whether there is a tree in front of us when we see a tree. He is saying that it 
is correct to speak of knowledge here—even indubitable knowledge—in the 
grammatical sense of knowing. “I know” here signals the fact that “this stands fast,” 
that there is no such thing as a doubt in this context, that this is an objective 
certainty. It does not express an epistemic relationship between a subject and a 
proposition.25 If I understand him correctly, the point he is making is that this kind 
of obvious, practical, active, tacit, animal certainty is unshaken, because it is not a 
form of knowledge in the empirical sense of the term. As Stanley Cavell famously 
                                                        
23 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 424. 
24 Ibid., § 425. Notice that Wittgenstein wrote these remarks on the same day when he also 
observed: “So I am saying something that sounds like pragmatism. / Here I am being thwarted by 
a kind of Weltanschauung.” (§ 422, March 21st, 1951) 
25 On the grammatical use of “I know” see Annalisa Coliva, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, 
Certainty and Common Sense (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 74 ff. 
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argued, Wittgenstein is saying that our basic and fundamental relationship with 
the world is not one of (empirical) knowing. This is to say that, if we want to see 
this relationship as one of knowing, then we must admit that we do not really 
know that this is a tree, that my name is so-and-so, etc. We do not know this, in 
the empirical sense of “knowing,” because we know this, in the grammatical sense 
of “knowing:” we are sure about this, it stands fast for us. 
Where is the fallibilism in this position? It lies in the acknowledgment that 
it still might turn out, for some unexpected reasons, that we failed. It might turn 
out that the tree that I have seen here my whole life long eventually discloses as 
something different (say, a picture, or a hologram). It might turn out that one 
morning I open the door of my house and find myself in front of a ravine, because 
a landslide has occurred during the night. Or it might turn out that according to 
the General Registrar’s Office my name is spelled differently that I have always 
thought. The physical possibility of a failure of knowledge remains open.26 Why is 
this not a form of skepticism? Because this physical possibility does not touch the 
objective certainty and the instinctive trust with which I live. It is misleading to 
conclude, from the extremely unlikely possibility that when I open my front door I 
find myself in front of a ravine, that the certainty with which I open the door 
every day is just “hastiness or superficiality.”27 
Perhaps Venturinha would reply to my concern by highlighting that the 
very unlikely possibilities described above were already excluded from the 
contextual situation we are considering, and that within the context we are 
considering, our knowledge is infallible. Yet, it is precisely in this context, and not 
in a hypothetical skeptical scenario, that it might turn out that my front door 
opens on a ravine. The possibilities that need be excluded, as I see the problem, are 
alternative contexts, such as the skeptical ones, rather than extremely unlikely but 
nonetheless concrete possibilities within our context. And because we cannot 
exclude them, we cannot claim that our knowledge is infallible. 
To wrap up. Among the merits of this challenging and thought-provoking 
little book, is the stimulation of reflections on a vast array of topics. I have chosen 
                                                        
26 See Luigi Perissinotto, “‘… to begin at the beginning’: The Grammar of Doubt in 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty,” in Doubt, Ethics and Religion: Wittgenstein and the Counter-
Enlightenment, eds. Luigi Perissinotto and Vicente Sanfelix (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2011), 
155–182. 
27 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 358. This does not mean that in order to defeat skepticism we 
just have to appeal to natural dispositions or pragmatic reasons in a Humean / Strawsonian 
fashion. Contrasting skepticism rather requires showing that it is part of the grammar of our 
concept of doubt, that doubt can only arise against a backdrop of certainty. This of course is a 
much wider issue on which I cannot expand here. 
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one—fallibilism vs. infallibilism—which has allowed me to expand on some 
similarities I see between the later Wittgenstein of On Certainty and the 
pragmatists. If my reading of On Certainty is correct on this point, then 
Venturinha’s contextual infallibilism does not find support in the later 
Wittgenstein—more specifically: the “contextualist” part of it does, but the 
“infallibilist” part does not. I am sure his reply will provide new insights and push 
the debate further, both on On Certainty and on contextualism. 
